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A country faces a downturn in the demand for its exports.  The slowdown in exports has 
translated into an overall economic slowdown for the economy.  As the unemployment 
rate increases, its tax revenue fall, and though it has only a very limited welfare program, 
expenditures there have increased, so that its overall budget position has turned negative.   
The country has a primary surplus, and even, given its limited indebtedness, a zero 
structural deficit so long as it can finance its deficit at a reasonable interest rate, given 
appropriate real accounting conventions.  The country has a moderate inflation of 8%, a 
debt GDP ratio of 40%, and pays an interest rate of 12% (on domestic loans,).  Thus, its 
interest payments amount to 4.8% of GDP.  With tax revenues amounting to 20% of 
GDP, interest payments amount to close to a quarter of all tax revenues.  The government 
realizes, however, that with inflation, the real value of its debt is shrinking at 8%, so that 
its real interest burden amounts to only a third as much, just 1.6% of GDP, well within its 
coping ability.    
 
 
Though the slowdown in the economy has reduced imports, exports have fallen more, so 
that the trade deficit has increased, to seemingly unsustainable levels, as a percentage of 
GDP.  The government has intervened in the exchange market, worried that a devaluation 
would increase inflation, and that a weak currency would undermine confidence in the 
country.  To strengthen the exchange rate and to ward off speculators, it has also raised 
the interest rate, and this too has contributed to the economic slowdown. 
 
 
What is the country to do?  The standard textbook remedy for a closed economy is to 
lower interest rates and increased government expenditures (fiscal and monetary 
stimulation) to return the economy to full employment.  The country worries though 
about the consequences for its budget, and how it will finance the deficit. It worries that 
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an increase in the deficit will force it to pay higher interest rates on its already 
outstanding debt, and that will start a viscious negative budgetary cycle.   It turns to the 
IMF for advice, and is provided with the standard prescription: 
 
THE IMF STRATEGY 
 
Cut expenditures and raise taxes, to restore fiscal balance.   Some adjustment in the 
exchange rate is advised, but accompanied by a strong warning concerning the 
inflationary consequences, and to ward off these—and to prevent excessive 
devaluation—interest rates are increased.   With fiscal balance restored, market 
confidence will be restored, and with that, confidence will return, investment will surge, 
and the economy’s strength will quickly be restored.   
 
The country asks, which countries have followed that advice, with the successful 
predicted outcomes, and how long did it take?  What were the driving forces in the 
recovery? 
 
Mexico’s case is cited.  But the country notes the special circumstances of the Mexican 
case:  a huge bail-out (which the IMF is not offering now); access to the large American 
market, which at the time was booming, with the close integration of the two economies 
being recently furthered by NAFTA; and because of the close integration, Mexican 
exporting firms did not have to rely on Mexican banks for finance.1  The country is 
worried about the paucity of other examples; the IMF says that its advice would have 
worked in many other cases, but there was inadequate follow through by the country, 
sometimes because the fiscal austerity that was imposed led to riots and overthrew the 
government.  
 
{Are there other examples? }   
 
Underlying this advice are certain assumptions about expectations and dynamics.  A more 
detailed analysis requires taking into account (i) export and import price elasticities and 
adjustment lags; (ii) firm, government and overall country balance sheets, including 
foreign dollar denominated debts, especially short term debts; (iii) ability of the 
government to impose effective controls on capital outflows; (iv) government’s ability 
currently to raise capital on the domestic or foreign market; (v) dynamics of inflation; and 
(vi) the government’s ability to manage its trade deficit. 
 
Critique of the IMF assumptions 
 
Investors, both short and long term, lack confidence that the IMF policies will work, 
either because they are unsure of the IMF economic model, or because they are uncertain 
of the political sustainability of the policies.  Given that elections are coming up in the 
country, there is no way that the country can provide assurances on the latter.   
 
                                                 
1 For further discussions of the Mexican case, see Perry et al.  reference.  Also get data on the size of 
fiscal 
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As a result, they take a wait-and-see attitude.  They do not immediately pull their money 
out of the country, but neither do they put more money into the country.  The immediate 
impact of the contractionary monetary and fiscal policies is then to reduce domestic 
investment and GDP, exacerbating the economic downturn, and increasing 
unemployment.  Assume initially that expenditures and taxes were 20% of GDP.  GDP 
has fallen by 10%, public expenditures have remained fixed, so that they are now 22% of 
GDP, while taxes fall 1.2% of GDP for every percentage decline in GDP.  Hence tax 
revenues have declined 12%, and are now only 18% of GDP.  There is a 4% of GDP 
shortfall.    Assume the government reduces expenditures by 4% of GDP in an attempt to 
narrow the fiscal deficit.  With a multiplier of 2, GDP falls by 8%, and tax revenues fall 
9.6%.  Expenditures are now 17.3% of GDP, and revenues are now only approximately 
16% of GDP.  The budget gap has been narrowed, but far from eliminated.   
 
But this ignored the impact of the increase in interest rates, and the increasing investor 
and consumer pessimism as the economy goes into a deeper recession.  Assume that 
these lead to a modest 2% decrease in “autonomous” aggregate demand.  With a 
multiplier, GDP has now fallen an additional 4%, tax revenues an additional 4.8%.    
While government expenditures have not increased, as a percentage of GDP they have—
to 18.1%, while tax revenues have decreased, to less than 15.5%.  (check numbers)  The 
fiscal gap has hardly been closed.  And if aggregate demand falls 4%, then expenditures 
increase to approximately 19% of GDP, while tax revenues fall to slightly less than 14%-
-the fiscal gap has actually increased.   
 
Seeing the slight progress in restoring fiscal balance, and the amplification of the 
recession, the confidence of domestic and foreign investors evaporates.  Moreover, they 
become increasingly convinced that the exchange rate is not sustainable, and to 
compensate them for the expected depreciation of the currency, they insist on higher 
interest rates.  As their confidence evaporates, they also insist on higher interest rates to 
compensate them for the risk of default.  Interest rates increase from the 12% that they 
were before to 18%, adding another 2.4% of GDP to the fiscal deficit.  This adds  a new 
element in the downward vicious cycle.  A set of policies that was supposed to eliminate 
the fiscal deficit has led to a 50% increase.  The only good news is that the trade deficit 
has narrowed.  As GDP falls, so do imports.     
 
 Confidence in the government also evaporates—it has failed on  both its promise to 
restore fiscal balance and the economy.  It receives a strong lecture from the IMF on how 
it has not taken strong enough measures, and the country’s political turmoil is further 
blamed.  The country is urged to get its act together.  But a careful look at the above 
arithmetic shows that no amount of fiscal prudence would have done the trick. 
 
This analysis has focused on the demand side responses to the IMF policies, but there can 
be an equally adverse supply side response.  The high interest rates in the IMF program 
intended to stave off a large devaluation forces many firms with only normal 
indebtedness into financial stress.   The increasing number of bankruptcies weakens 
banks as well.  They are less willing and less able to provide funds.  There is a 
contraction of lending, and firms have less working capital to finance production, and 
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less retained earnings to finance investment.  Thus, firms are less able to produce, and 
less willing to bear the risks of production.  As production and employment decrease, 
there are further reductions in aggregate demand.  As firm’s shadow price of capital 
increases, as there funds for investment get reduced, the demand for capital goods is 
reduced, and there is thus an other round of reduction in aggregate demand.  There is a 
vicious downward spiral of downward shifts in aggregate demand and supply. 
 
Meanwhile, export performance weakens, both because exporters cannot find finance, 
and because importers cut back on their demand, worried by the high bankruptcy rate that 
firms in the country will not fulfill their commitments.  Because incomes have 
plummeted, imports have decreased, but the net improvement in the balance of trade is 
less than was expected. 
 
  
Is there any case where the IMF scenario works out well? 
 
One could imagine an alternative set of dynamics/expectations where the IMF scenario 
turns out more positively.  Investors, seeing the resolve of the country to address its 
problems, have confidence restored, and as they do so, the influx of short term capital 
allows the government to lower interest rates.  This stimulates domestic investment, and 
the overall confidence in the economy strengthens foreign investment, and the two work 
together to restore the economy to full employment, leading to a fiscal surplus.  This 
allows the government to restore the budget cuts.   
 
This happy ending shows that prudence and patience pays off, but it requires several 
strong assumptions.  Most importantly, the responsiveness of foreign direct investment 
and short term capital has to be large and quick—it is their expectation that the deficit 
will be reduced that leads them to be willing to put more money into the country, an 
expectation which may or may not be satisfied.  As we have seen, however, simply 
cutting government expenditures and raising interest rates to attract more capital need not 
reduce the deficit, and rational investors will know this.   
 
In a sense, what is required is that the “confidence” multipliers be greater than the 
traditional “Keynesian” multipliers, and that investors be willing to make their bets 
before they see the results.  Evidently, history provides us with relatively few examples 
of where that is the case.  
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ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS 
 
 
There is an alternative scenario that the country could have adopted.  It could have 
allowed the exchange rate to fall significantly, lowered interest rates, and increased 
government expenditures, following standard Keynesian orthodoxy.  The problem it 
confronts is how to finance the deficit? Critics worry that any way of financing the deficit 
will be inflationary, that the resulting inflation will be worse than the original disease, 
and that as the economy moves towards full employment with the Keynesian policies, the 
trade deficit will increase to an unsustainable level.  In the sections below, we argue that 
there are alternative ways of financing the deficit, not without risk, but that the risks 
associated with these alternative policies are far less—from the perspective of the 
economy as a whole—than those associated with the IMF strategy.   
 
 
A.  Suspending payments on outstanding debts and allowing the exchange rate to 
float relatively freely 
 
In the first—and most extreme—strategy, the government imposes a standstill on 
payments, and uses an expedited bankruptcy process (superchapter 11) for private firms 
that are unable to meet their debt obligations.  This is the framework that the IMF is now 
discussing, as an alternative to its failed big bail-out strategy, and it is important to think 
through how things might work out under that strategy. 
 
The government realizes that if it suspends payments on its outstanding debt, it saves 
4.8% of GDP.  It can use the proceeds to finance increased real expenditures.  Given an 
output multiplier of 2, this increases GDP by 9.6%, with a corresponding drop in 
unemployment.  With the economy quickly restored to close to full employment, the 
government’s deficit has disappeared, and it is once again able to resume payments.  
Slight adjustments in expenditures and taxes enable it to repay the arrears with interest.  
 
If what the country saves in paying interest payments (combined with monetary 
stimulation) is not enough to stimulate the economy back to close to full employment,  
there are low cost ways of borrowing that may do the trick.  These are described below. 
 
Allowing the exchange rate to float relatively freely will enable exports to grow, and this 
too will strengthen aggregate demand.  (On the other hand, bankruptcy and standstills 
reduces some of the strongest downward pressure on the currency, so that the magnitude 
of the decline in the exchange rate is far less than would otherwise have been the case.)  
A significant decrease in the exchange rate will have the further affect of allowing lower 
interest rates (through interest rate arbitrage)2, since the presumption will be that the 
exchange rate will be appreciating in the future.   
                                                 
2 While the capital controls are imposed, interest rate arbitrage will not work; but the fall in the exchange 
rate will put less pressure on the system of capital flows, and indeed, such controls may not have to be 
imposed at all. 
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Underlying this analysis is the recognition that not every dollar of government 
expenditure has the same effect in stimulating the economy.  Restructuring expenditure 
patterns towards “high” multiplier activities can thus lead to higher GDP.  Moreover, 
there are other government interventions (e.g. increased taxes on imported luxuries) 
which reduce the magnitude of “leakages” and thus again lead to higher GDP. 
Typically employed accounting frameworks do not provide an accurate picture of the 
impact of government expenditures or deficits on aggregate demand (and, accordingly, 
on the “inflationary” threat associated with such expenditures or deficits.  It is important 
for governments to work towards accounting frameworks that are more relevant for 
macro-economic management. 
 
Underlying the analysis below are three further hypotheses:  First, the welfare loss from 
the economic distortions associated with underutilization of resources are of a magnitude 
larger than any Harberger triangle associated with, say, tax interventions.  Second, capital 
markets are not well described by the standard competitive equilibrium model, and 
accordingly, there are many interventions which might seem to lead to significant 
resource misallocations which do not, and, conversely, some of the IMF seemingly 
market based interventions actually impair the functioning of the capital market.  And 
third, it is impossible to restore confidence in an economy that is experiencing a deep 
recession.   
 
The discussion below also relies more on the analysis of balance sheet and cash flow 
effects of various price changes than has been traditionally the case in macro-economic 





The IMF argues that the policy will result in a complete loss of confidence in the country. 
What little foreign investment was flowing into the country will be halted, and what 
capital that is there will flee.  As capital flees, the exchange rate will fall further; as 
investment is halted, the GDP will collapse further.  Moreover, the devaluation will set 
off an inflationary spiral.  The inflationary spiral will scare investors away, and undo the 
effect of the devaluation.  If the country has  large foreign denominated debt, the collapse 
of the exchange rate will increase the value of those debts in the local currency, forcing 
many firms into bankruptcy.  The supply interruption will further exacerbate the 
economic downturn.  The attempt to stem capital flows will also fail, but long term 
investors will be scared by the obvious hostility to capital and the breaking of the rules of 
the game. 
 
Meanwhile, the loss of investor confidence in the country from the suspension of 
payments on outstanding debts undermines long term investor confidence, which hurts 
growth in the long run. 
 
                                                 
3 References 
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Evaluation of the IMF critique 
 
Each of the phenomena which the IMF says may occur may indeed occur.  There are 
policies which the country can put into place to mitigate the adverse effects.  These may 
or may not work.  There is thus some downside risk.  But there is an upside potential.  
Critics of the IMF policies argue that the downside risk is smaller than with the IMF 
policies, and the upside potential greater.   
 
The country, aware of these potential risks, announces a modified inflation target, one 
which raises real interest rates as inflation increases, but which pays some attention to the 
level of unemployment.  It accompanies the suspension of payments with a temporary 
capital exit tax, tightly designed to focus on short term speculative money, making it 
clear that long term investors can take their money out freely.   (Malaysia provides the 
model.).  The exit tax also inhibits the shifting of deposits abroad, and the revenue raised 
by the exit tax improves the fiscal position.)  The devaluation of the currency, moreover, 
has reduced if not eliminated speculative pressure against the currency.  (The controls are 
mainly put into place to prevent the overshooting which sometimes occur in exchange 
rate adjustment processes.) 
 
Long term investors respond to the greater stability of the economy by maintaining, and 
even enhancing their investment.  The tax on short term capital flows allows real interest 
rates to be lower than they otherwise would have been, and this stimulates domestic 
investment.  The devaluation leads to increased exports, and the higher returns in the 
export industry contribute to a further increase in investment.   
 
With these protective measures in place, there is a good chance that the Keynesian 
measures work exactly as predicted, without the adverse side effects.   
 
In the paragraphs below we evaluate more closely each of the concerns raised by the IMF 
critique, in an attempt to identify the circumstances in which they might be most relevant.   
 
a.  Access to capital 
 
i.  Threat of loss of access to short term capital in the short term 
 
The IMF is correct in one aspect of its diagnosis:  the export tax combined with the 
suspension of the payments makes the country an unattractive place for short term 
capital.  But the pessimistic outlook for the country meant that there were no capital 
inflows before the imposition of these measures, and considerable outflows.  The IMF is 
thus wrong in its diagnosis of the short run impact:  impeding the capital outflows 
strengthens the currency, and, given any target exchange rate, allows a lower interest rate. 
 
ii.  Threat of loss of access to capital in the long term.   
 
The IMF is wrong, however, in its diagnosis of the long run impact.  Markets are forward 
looking.  Capital asks now what was the return in the past, but what will the return be in 
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the future.  The lower interest rates mean that the government’s fiscal deficit is lower; its 
financial position is improved.  Moreover, the number of the firms that are forced into 
bankruptcy is lowered, both because of the lower interest rates and because of the 
improved overall economic performance of the economy.  Thus government tax revenues 
are increased—again improving the fiscal position of the government.  Moreover, to the 
extent that the government gets involved in restructuring, the amount of restructuring 
required will be less, and again the fiscal burden will be lowered.  And because there are 
fewer defaults, the supply side of the economy is stronger (with less adverse effect both 
on the corporate and financial sector.)   All of this means that the government’s financial 
position is stronger going forward, making it more (not less) likely that creditors will be 
willing to provide finance.  (There is a counterargument, that the country will obtain a 
reputation for defaulting, but there is some question about the appropriateness of such 
reputation models to the situation on hand.  Reputation models make most sense when 
past behavior conveys information about an otherwise hard to observe characteristic of an 
individual, from which one can infer likely future behavior. 
The factors influencing repayment, in this case, are easy to observe; and little if any 
additional information is conveyed, particularly since the decision to default is a political 
decision, and the political context can change dramatically in the space of a few years.)   
 
Empirically, there is little evidence in support of the IMF position.4  Russia returned to 
the market within two years of its default, which was admittedly a “messy one” involving 
no prior consultation with creditors, and on that accord roundly condemned.  Korea, 
which forced a rollover, somewhat more gracefully than Russia (creditors were given a 
choice of either rolling over the loans or not getting repaid, and recognizing them as in 
default.  While in terms of cash flow, the two alternatives look little different, many firms 
would prefer not to have to recognize the loss, so that the alternative of roll overs looks 
more attractive.) 
 
The argument that markets will punish any defaulters ignores the central distinction 
between competitive markets and monopolies.  There may be a public interest among 
creditors in providing conditions which will ensure that debtors repay, but such an 
environment is a public good, and it is not in the interests of any small creditor to bear the 
cost of providing that environment.   
 
Under certain circumstances, it is conceivable that creditors might be able to act 
collusively; that is, creditors engage in a large number of cooperative activities, 
involving, for instance, sharing information; it is conceivable that the creditors could 
exclude from the “club” any creditor who did not go along with sanctions imposed on a 
defaulter.  However, it is not clear that such coercive actions by the creditors collectively 
would withstand anti-trust scrutiny, nor is it clear that the value of the cooperation is 
sufficiently great to induce many firms who might otherwise find it profitable to lend 
from doing so.  Thus, in practice, it is apparent that the threat of credit being cutting off 
appears not to be effective. 
 
                                                 
4 see if one can find empirical studies, references 
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Of course, it makes sense for an institution which is charged with trying to make credit 
markets would more effectively (and particularly from the perspective of the creditors 
themselves) to try to convince borrowers that should they default, or engage in a 
standstill, they would have to face a high price for this bad behavior, including the cut off 
of credit.  The fact that many countries act as if they seem to believe this message means 
suggests that the threat is taken seriously.  (and it may make sense for a risk averse 
politician, since if the IMF were correct, there might be serious long term downside 
risks.) 
 
iii.  Desirability of openness to short term capital as a discipline device   
 
Even though it is recognized that one cannot invest in factories or create jobs on the basis 
of short term capital, there are those who argue that the openness to foreign capital 
provides an important discipline, helping create an environment which is conducive to 
investment.  This argument is dealt with more extensively in the capital market 
liberalization policy paper, where the contrary argument that short term capital flows 
represent a capricious disciplinarian, often punishing countries even when they perform 
well, and imposing a particular set of perspectives about what is “good” economic policy, 
which may or may not conform to the policies which either maximize growth or which 
the country might want to pursue on other grounds.  More to the point, if the country is 
concerned with long term investment, it should subject itself to the discipline of long 
term investors, listening to what they care about, which may or may not coincide with the 
interests of short term speculators.   
 
iv.  Desirability of long term financial capital.   
 
Some would argue that even if there were a loss of access to long term credit, the adverse 
effects would not be significant.5  A distinction is made between these financial flows 
and foreign direct investment which brings with it management, technology, and access 
to markets.  In some cases, access to the additional resources can be important.  But in 
other cases, its benefits may be more ambiguous:  (i) if a country already has adequate 
savings (as was the case in many of the East Asian countries) there may be problems in 
investing the additional funds well; (ii) the inflow of funds puts upward pressure on the 
exchange rate, and the appreciation can create a version of the Dutch disease problem.  If 
the bottleneck in investment is the important of foreign capital goods, then the inflow of 
funds is positive, for it then simply provides the foreign exchange required to finance the 
investment, and the exchange rate does not appreciate.   
 
 
b.  Induced bankruptcy and corporate stress: devaluations and interest rate 
increases 
 
The IMF recommended policies attempt to limit the reduction in the exchange rate by 
large bail-outs combined with large increases in interest rates.  It is based on the 
argument that such large depreciations are bad because they cause large levels of 
                                                 
5 Studies showing impact on growth of long term financial inflows 
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corporate stress (because devaluations increase the real value of debts in local currency, 
beyond debtors’ ability to cope) and induce inflation.  The high levels of bankruptcy may 
be a concern either because of the impact on the overall economy, or because of its 
impact on foreign creditors.  But raising interest rates to high levels and increasing the 
country’s indebtedness also has adverse effects.  It may lead to high levels of bankruptcy 
as well.   
 
There are two related questions:  (a) Can the government limit the degree of devaluation, 
in particular by raising interest rates?  and (b) what are the costs to the economy of trying 
to limit the devaluation, who bears those costs, and how do they compare with the costs 
of allowing the devaluation. 
 
The logic of the IMF strategy? Can a temporary intervention lead to long term effects? 
 
 Before explaining why raising interest rates to stabilize the exchange rate is likely 
to be countereproductive, we turn to a more fundamental problem, a seeming flaw in the 
logic.  The argument is that a temporary increase in interest rates can lead to a permanent 
strengthening in the currency as a result of a restoration of confidence; and because the 
increase in interest rates is temporary, there is no long run damage.    In effect, those who 
hold this view seem to be saying that an intervention that leads to a movement along the 
demand curve for the country’s currency leads to a shift of the demand curve for the 
country’s currency.  There is a change in beliefs.  Why there should be a change in 
beliefs, however, is typically not spelled out.  On the contrary, if investors know that the 
reason that the exchange rate has moved in the indicated direction is because of the 
intervention, there is no reason for them to alter their beliefs about the underlying 
structures.  They can continue to believe that the exchange rate will remain at the higher 
level so long as the intervention continues, and that it will fall to a lower level when the 
intervention is stopped.  To be sure, there may be other factors affecting beliefs.  They 
may have believed that the moderate devaluation that was allowed would lead to high 
inflation, and when that does not occur, their confidence that the real devaluation will be 
sustained may increase.  Changes in economic circumstances may lead to a concurrent 
change in the behavior of government and firms, such that the government removes the 
intervention at the same time that the private sectors confidence increases.  It might 
appear that the intervention caused the increase in confidence.  What caused the increase 
in confidence was, however, something else.  In the case of Mexico, for instance, the real 
devaluation led to an increase in exports, and the gradual strengthening of the economy 
restored confidence in their economy.  There is no evidence that the bail-out packages 
(including the high interest rates) directly led to a strengthening of confidence.6   
 
There has been relatively little research on the process of expectation formation in 
circumstances such as those of concern here.7  Rational expectations models, however, 
provide some guidance in how to evaluate the arguments.  A shift in the demand curve 
occurs as a result of a change in beliefs, which in turn is the result of information which 
                                                 
6 Reference to Perry et al paper 
7 references 
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has been conveyed, i.e. signaling.8  But signals convey information only when they are 
costly, so that the argument that there is little cost from a temporary rise in interest rates 
but nonetheless the signal conveys information makes little sense.9   In the case of the 
Latin American countries that were pursuing loose monetary policies, the switch to tight 
monetary policy might convey a change in regime, particularly when accompanied by 
institutional changes, and this in turn could affect expectations.  On the other hand, in 
East Asia, where monetary authorities did not pursue lose monetary policies, it is hard to 
see why tightening monetary policy would convey information about a new monetary 
regime; on the contrary, the use of such inappropriate policies to address the problems, 
policies which actually exacerbated them, may signal a lack of competence on the part of 
the monetary authorities, and thus shift the demand curve for the currency in the other 
direction.   
 
 
Evaluation of the argument that higher interest rates leads to capital inflows and 
strengthens the exchange rate 
 
The IMF argues that the higher interest rates make it more attractive for individuals to put 
money into the country, and the induced capital inflow strengthens the exchange rate.  
Moreover, the higher interest rate makes speculating against the currency by borrowing 
in the local currency, converting into dollars, and repaying with devalued dollars, less 
attractive.   
 
Furman and Stiglitz [    ] and others, however, argue that there is little evidence that 
raising interest rates in general has the desired effect.  To the extent that the weaknesses 
in the exchange rate are caused by speculation, the higher interest rates may stem that, 
but the cost to the real economy and to the government is large, and these real costs often 
predominate.10    There are two reasons that increasing rates may prove ineffective.  Both 
are related to the fact that investors are worried about the risk adjusted expected return, 
not the “promised” return.  Increases in the nominal interest rate may lead to a lowering 
of the risk adjusted expected return.   
 
1. When firms inside the country are heavily indebted, with short term loans, or 
loans with variable interest rates, then the increased interest rates induces 
corporate stress; even firms that are not forced into bankruptcy face significant 
losses in net worth, and thus contract production.   The weakening of the economy 
may be so great that the risk adjusted expected returns is actually lowered.  Thus, 
capital starts to move out, rather than flow in.   
2. When governments are heavily indebted, the increase in interest rates worsens 
their fiscal position, forcing them either to cut back expenditures, raise taxes, or 
                                                 
8 references 
9 Stiglitz [   ] has also argued that one needs to ask who bears the costs of the signal; increasing the 
independence of the central bank may imjply that central banks bear less of the cost of interest rate 
increases, so that changes in interest rates become a less effective signal, or lequivalently, there have to be 
larger change sin interest rates.  Independence requires more volatility in interest rates.   
10 In the case of East Asia, the IMF argued that speculation did not play an important role in the crisis.  If 
this were true, it would have further undermined their argument for raising interest rates. 
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borrow more.  Fiscal contraction exacerbates the economic downturn, worsening 
confidence in the economy; but failure to cut expenditures or raise taxes lead to 
increasing market worries about the ability to finance the increasing deficit.  Both 
lead to decreasing confidence in the country, a possible lowering of the risk 
adjusted expected returns, and a capital outflow that weakens the currency. 
3. The higher interest rates typically leads to lower asset prices, and the lower asset 
prices lead to a deterioration of both firm’s willingness to produce (aggregate 
supply), willingness to invest (aggregate demand), and willingness to hire.  
Similarly, lower employment rates, decreasing asset values, and overall increasing 
uncertainty lead to a reduction in consumer demand.  Thus, aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply both decrease, leading to a further decrease in GDP, an increase 
in bankruptcy, an increase in overall riskiness, a lowering of tax revenue, a 
worsening of government fiscal position, and---on all accounts—a lowering of the 
risk adjusted expected return.   
4. The above effects are likely to play out especially within financial markets; as 
firms default on their loans, and firms appear in increasingly precarious position, 
banks and other financial institutions may be increasingly unwilling to lend.  Just 
as foreigners see a decrease in the risk adjusted expected returns, so too do 
domestic lenders.   
5. The impact on firm balance sheets of increasing interest rates may differ markedly 
across firms, and the less transparent firm balance sheets are, or the more 
important are non-marketed assets within the balance sheet, the more uncertainty 
there will be about the position of different firms.   
6. These effects are exacerbated if the government strictly enforces risk adjusted 
capital adequacy standards; for the increased amounts of non-performing loans 
and the increased default rates will require banks to put aside more money into 
reserve and raise new capital, or cut back on loans.  During the economic 
downturn, it will be difficult to raise new bank capital, and under standard 
procedures, the government will lack the wherewithal to provide additional 
capital to banks.11   
7. As a result of the factors listed above, lending rates may increase even more than 
interbank rates, and there may be credit rationing.  Perceived risk of lending will 
increase because of the increased risk of default and the increased uncertainty 
about the state of firms’ balance sheets.  The ability and willingness of the 
financial system to bear risk and to supply capital will be impaired.   
8. As a result,  even firms that might otherwise have been able and willing to 
produce and sell more (e.g. increase exports as a result of devaluation) cannot 
obtain the finance to do so, or can obtain finance only at terms that make it 
unattractive for them to increase production..  There is some controversy over the 
importance of credit rationing (discussed in appendix B). 
9. There are a number of other supply side and demand side effects that appear 
significant in extreme cases, such as in East Asia.  There may be supply side 
impacts on the transportation system, raising costs of production, and making it 
more difficult to export.  On the demand side, the increased probability of default 
                                                 
11 Stiglitz [?] has described how the government can provide finance for recapitalization of banks in a low 
cost way. 
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makes firms in the country unreliable suppliers, so that the demand for their 
exports may decrease, in spite of the large devaluation.  The high interest rates 
combined with the devaluation may make the purchase of foreign capital goods 
more expensive; to the extent that foreign capital goods are complements with 
domestic capital goods, this will lead to a decrease in domestic aggregate demand 




This analysis makes clear that the possibility of adverse effects of increasing 
interest rates markedly is more likely 
 The greater the indebtedness of firms 
 The greater the indebtedness of government 
 The greater the impact of interest rate increases on asset prices 
 The less the transparency of government, firms, or financial institutions 
 The weaker financial institutions 
 
Even when increasing interest rates does not lead to a capital outflow, and a 
further weakening of the currency, the net strengthening may be limited, since the 
increase in the risk adjusted expected returns will be far smaller than the increase 
in the nominal interest rate. 
 
 
Note that there are some limiting cases where the adverse effects will be limited.  
If a government has little indebtedness and if firms traditionally rely on self 
finance (so they too have little indebtedness), then the short term capital market is 
relatively unconnected to the real economy, so the adverse effects may not arise. 
 
There are some cases where there may be some positive effects.  Increasing 
interest rates may lead some local businessmen who large amounts of funds 
abroad to bring their money back, as the cost of borrowing at home soars.  In 
many cases, however, this effect seems weak, because of the lack of credible 
enforcement of bankruptcy.  The owners, who may owe the bank considerable 
amounts, believe that the bank will not foreclose.  The threat of exacerbating the 
economic disruption and the refusal of courts to enforce bankruptcy when the 
problems are viewed to be macro-economic problems beyond the control of the 
firm puts existing owners in a strong bargaining position.  The bank would rather 
roll over the loan rather than to declare the loan non-performing.  Thus, while the 
entrepreneur may not borrow more from the firm, neither will he risk more of his 
own money.  He will play a waiting game, hoping that their will be a bail-out of 
some kind, at least a partial debt-forgiveness.  Moreover, in many countries, the 
owners can engage in a process of assert stripping (or tunneling) diverting assets 
                                                 
12 In the case of Mexico, and other countries, it appears that the cash flow effects, credit rationing, and the 
interest rate effects predominate, so that there market decreases in investment.  See Perry et al 
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to their own account and away from the corporations, so that should the bank 
foreclose, there will be relatively few assets left.13   
 
There is one other positive effect of increasing deposit rates:  it increases incomes 
of savers, who then increase their aggregate demand.  The question is, will the 
increase in deposit rates be translated into an increase in lending rates?  And if so, 
how adverse an effect will this have on investment, and thus aggregate demand?  
In the case of Thailand, in 2001, the Thai government seemed to take the position 
that the positive effect of increasing deposit rates more than offset any possible 
adverse effect of increasing the lending rate, possibly because lending rates were 
set (as in the usual credit rationing models) to maximize (risk adjusted) expected 
returns, and were therefore relatively insensitive to deposit rates.  While policy 
analysts should be aware of this possible effect, it would appear that in relatively 
few circumstances is it likely to be sufficiently large as to reverse the normal 
presumptions.  
 
Assessing the adverse effects of devaluation 
 
 How much effort should the government put in in trying to stave off a large 
devaluation?  What are the costs of a devaluation?  A devaluation is, of course, nothing 
more than a change in the relative price of the currency, relative to other currencies.  The 
effects depend on the balance sheet of the country:  (a)  If the country as a whole is 
heavily in debt to those abroad, the devaluation will increase the burden of the debt 
(measured in domestic currency), and this adverse effect on balance sheets of households 
and firms will decrease aggregate demand, decrease aggregate supply, and lead to higher 
nominal interest rates, to compensate for the increased risk.  If the country is in a net 
creditor position (such as Japan), then the devaluation will have positive balance sheet 
effects, stimulating consumption, investment, and production.  Malaysia’s central bank 
had imposed restrictions that limited the dollar denominated debts of corporations, so that 
the adverse effects of devaluation there were likely markedly less than in country’s with 
greater foreign exchange exposure.  (b)  To the extent that the debt is held by firms with 
an uncovered foreign exchange position, it will lead to an increase in bankruptcy.  If the 
debt is held by exporters, then they gain in exports (in the present discounted value of 
future profits) some of what they lose on their formal balance sheet.  If firms are rational 
and risk averse, then their exposure will be limited.  But it is an empirical question.  In 
the case of Thailand, the debt was heavily held by those in the real estate sector, where 
the bubble had already burst.  These firms were already bankrupt, so that the incremental 
cost of devaluation was nil.  (c)  To the extent that the government is in debt, the 
devaluation will worsen its balance sheet.  To the extent that the government derives 
revenue from natural resources, like oil, that are priced in dollars, the devaluation 
improves their balance sheet (and cash flow) measured in local currency.  For resource 
dependent country, this effect can be important (cf. Russia, Venezuela) 
 
 These adverse effects have to be set against the positive effects, as well as the 
adverse effects associated with trying to prevent the devaluation.  Among the positive 
                                                 
13 These problems occurred, for instance, in Ecuador.   
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effects are those associated with the increased exports.   The importance of this effect will 
depend, of course, both the size of exports and the elasticity.  The elasticity of exports (in 
the short and medium term) differs markedly across countries.  Countries which face 
quotas may not be able to export more, but prices of these goods may be fixed in dollars, 
so that the revenues obtained (in local currency) may increase.   
 
Assessing the long run adverse effects of attempting to prevent a devaluation 
 
It is thus clear that the magnitude of the adverse (or positive)  effects associated with 
large devaluations differ markedly across economies.  But, as we have already noted, 
there can be large costs associated with attempting to prevent a devaluation,  say be 
increasing interest rates.  In addition, there are long run costs associated with government 
intervention, of any type.  In particular, if those inside the country come to believe that if 
enough of them borrow in foreign currency, the government will bail them out or 
otherwise act to prevent a major exchange rate change, their incentive to purchase 
insurance against this risk will be reduced, and hence, the government’s freedom of 
action (or, in any case, the costs of allowing the exchange rate to devalue will be 
increased.)  This, in turn, will mean that there will be more economic volatility, and this 
in turn will mean that the country will be a less attractive place to invest.  Moreover, it 
makes debt riskier, and given the absence of equity markets, this too will impair debt 
financed growth, forcing firms to rely more on self-finance.  Thus the overall efficiency 
of the capital market will be impaired, and the rate of growth decreased.   
 
There are particularly large long run adverse effects associated with relying on interest 
rates to prevent devaluations.   The adverse effects of increasing interest rates persist long 
after the interest rates are reduced. There are important hysteresis effects. The high 
interest rates force some firms into bankruptcy, as we have noted, and lower interest rates 
does not unbankrupt them.  There can be a permanent loss of informational and 
organizational capital, and if the bankruptcy procedures are prolonged, the asset stripping 
can even lead to the effective destruction of physical capital.  But even firms that have 
not gone bankrupt will see their net worth eroded, and it will take a long time for that net 
worth to be restored.  These adverse net worth effects have thus persistent impacts both 
on aggregate supply and aggregate demand.  
 
Similarly, the high interest rates are likely to have adverse effects on the government’s 
balance sheet, as it is unable to restrain expenditures to offset the higher costs of 
borrowing (and if it does, GDP falls even further).  Moreover, if the government bears 
some of the costs of restructuring financial institutions and corporations which are forced 
into bankruptcy because of the high interest rate policy, as it almost surely will, then 
again the government’s balance sheet will be adversely affected.  Finally, for any given 
level of aggregate demand stimulation, the higher interest rates force greater reliance on 
fiscal measures, so that there is likely to be more government borrowing, again with 
adverse effects on the government’s balance sheets.   
 
Balancing off the costs and benefits 
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 While the benefit of increasing interest rates may be limited, the costs may be 
large.  The previous section spelled  these costs—in terms of the weakening of the 
balance sheets of households, firms, and government.    On the other hand, for some 
countries, the costs of a devaluation may be small—and in the case of some countries, 
there may be benefits.  The evaluation of these costs and benefits has to be done on a 
country by country basis.  Still, some generalizations emerge:  the risks of the high 
interest rate policy (relative to the benefits) are large for countries with high levels of 
corporate indebtedness, such as those in East Asia; and the benefits of preventing a 
devaluation were likely especially limited for Thailand and Malaysia. In such countries, 
reliance on corporate bankruptcy proceedings (especially if there is a super chapter 11 
provision) by itself may suffice to prevent an overly large devaluation.  On the other 
hand, for countries like Brazil, in which firms have limited indebtedness, but in which the 
government has a high level of indebtedness, a high interest rate policy may have an 
especially adverse effect on the government’s balance sheet, unless the government 
resorts to one of the low-cost ways of borrowing (associated with exploiting the 
possibility of segmenting the capital market), described below. 
 
Equity concerns and the relationship between economic stability 
 
 While the analysis so far has focused on aggregate impacts, it has been clear that 
different policies impact different groups differently.  Devaluations affect those who have 
large amounts of foreign debt; increases in domestic interest rates affect those who have 
borrowed domestically.  Unemployment affects workers.   
 
Normal social welfare functions associate higher social costs with adverse impacts on 
those who are poorer, and less capable of absorbing the shock.  Thus, it stresses the costs 
on workers forced into unemployment or small businesses forced into bankruptcy more 
than the costs of large firms that might be forced into liquidation or foreign lenders that 
might not get loans fully repaid. 
 
But there are two further dimensions:  the crises in East Asia were, in some sense, caused 
by excessive borrowing in foreign denominated short term loans.  There is a fundamental 
inequity in making innocent bystanders bear a disproportionate share of the costs, though 
they get none of the benefits.  The lenders, had they exercised due diligence, would have 
restricted lending. The borrowers, had they acted prudently, would have bought cover for 
their foreign exchange exposure.  In these cases, the bail-outs and attempts to maintain 
the exchange rate at a high level, not only induce an inequity, but induce a longer run 
moral hazard problem (attenuating incentives to engage in due diliegence in lending or to 
obtain cover when borrowing.) 
 
The second is that when citizens see billions of dollars going to bail out foreign banks, or 
the government borrowing billions to maintain an exchange rate at a high level, allowing 
the rich to take their money out of the country at more favorable terms, but are then told 
there is no money left for minimal subsidies for the poor, they perceive a grave injustifce 
has been created, and this can give rise to political and social turmoil, and such turmoil 
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can make the country an unattractive place for investment.  Perceptions about fairness 
cannot be separated from economic policy.  
 
The Risks and Consequences of Overshooting 
 
 One of the arguments for government (IMF) intervention in the exchange rate 
market is that, left to itself, the market will overshoot.  There are many examples of this 
(e.g. Brazil.)  Note that overshooting, by itself, does not necessarily imply a market 
inefficiency; there is no theorem that says that efficient dynamics entails monotonic 
convergence. 
 
Overshooting has one major benefit.  With overshooting, the markets expectations are 
that there is likely to be an appreciation of the currency, and this allows domestic interest 
rates to be lower than they otherwise would have been.  And this stimulates the economy.  
Moreover, the overshooting can lead to an upsurge in the demand for exports, again 
strengthening the economy. 
 
The main worry about overshooting is that it will give rise to an inflationary episode.  But 
if there is really overshooting, the market will come to expect an appreciation, which 
itself will serve to dampen inflationary expectations, and it is these inflationary 
expectations which lead to inflation inertia.  The overshooting in Brazil did not lead to a 
significant inflationary episode. 
 
 
   c.   Inflationary threat   
 
More generally, one of the arguments against allowing the exchange rate to depreciate 
much is that it may give rise to inflation.  The critical issues here are (i) the magnitude of 
the pass through and (ii) persistence.   The first depends in part on the magnitude, the 
structure of the imports, and the competitiveness of markets.  If imports are a small 
fraction of GDP, then the impact on overall inflation is likely to be small.  If imports are 
mainly final luxury consumer goods, and markets are very competitive, then again the 
magnitude of the pass through may be limited.  If markets are not very competitive, firms 
setting prices as a mark-up over costs, and the imports are at an early stage of production, 
then there can be significant pass through. 
 
The persistence of the inflationary pulse depends on the inflationary process, including 
the nature of expectation formation.  If individuals perceive the price adjustment as a one 
time event, then there is no reason that it would set off an inflationary spiral.  On the 
other hand, the belief that the change would initiate inflation momentum can be self-
fulfilling.  Tightness in labor and product markets may affect this inflationary 
momentum.  If the unemployment rate is high, then wages may not rise, even though 
workers see that their cost of living has gone up.  If firms see themselves competing in 
highly competitive markets, then the opportunity for raising prices will be limited.   
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One case of continuing concern is that were the inflation leads to further devaluation, 
which gives rise to the expectation of future inflation, which gives rise to wage demands, 
which ensures that those expectations of future inflation are realized.  The worry is that 
this can give rise to an ever increasing spiral of inflation.  There are three separate issues, 
dealt with at greater length in the policy paper on inflation14:  (a)  Are there significant 
adverse effects on growth associated with moderate levels of inflation?  The evidence is 
that there are not,15 and there is even some theory which argues that there needs to be 
some inflation for the economy to adjust smoothly to changing circumstances, changes 
which are particularly important in developing and transition economies.  (b)  Is there 
inflation momentum?  Once inflation starts, does it pick up speed?  Is there a “precipice”?  
Again, the evidence is that there is not.16   (c)  Finally, if inflation does pick up, is it 
costly to reverse?  Are these costs disproportionate with the benefits associated with the 
pick-up in inflation?  That is, does the economy have to “force” a much higher rate of 
unemployment to disinflate a given amount than the lower rate of unemployment it 
enjoyed during the period in which inflation picked up?  Again, the answer seems to be 
that the costs of disinflation are limited.17 
 
Recent episodes, such as those in Brazil and East Asia show little evidence that even 
large devaluations will give rise to significant inflationary impulse.18   
 
Note that for countries facing deflation pressures, the inflationary impulse may be a net 
benefit.  Deflations can have adverse effects, increasing bankruptcy and corporate stress, 
as the real value of what is owed is larger than was “anticipated.”19   
 
d.  Trade Deficits 
 
Many countries facing a crisis face not only a fiscal deficit, but a trade deficit.  In some 
cases, IMF policies seem more focused on the trade deficit than on the fiscal deficit.  In 
the case of Thailand, where the country clearly had a structural surplus, one of the 
arguments put forward for contractionary fiscal policies was that it was necessary to 
bring the trade deficit back into balance.   
 
The existence of a trade deficit means, of course, that a country has to finance the trade 
deficit, which in turn means that there must be capital inflows.  (There is a basic identity, 
that trade deficit = capital inflows.)  There is a crisis if the country cannot finance its 
trade deficit.   
 
The sense of crisis is quite different, of course, in a fixed exchange rate regime than in a 
floating exchange rate regime.  In a fixed exchange rate regime, firms have the “right” to 
buy foreign exchange at a fixed price, to buy imports.  If the supply of foreign exchange 
                                                 




18 literature.  Chart showing magnitude of devaluation, increase in inflation rate 12, 24, 36 months 
after devaluation. 
19 Fisher (debt deflation), other references 
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(at those fixed prices) exceeds the demand, there is a problem, a crisis.  But in a flexible 
exchange rate system, the exchange rate depreciates, making imports more expensive and 
exports cheaper.  This naturally leads to a decrease in imports, and thus a decrease in the 
trade deficit.  There is a crisis only if the required adjustment of the exchange rate is 
viewed to be excessive.  It is the unwillingness to accept the requisite change in the 
exchange rate that a trade deficit represents a problem under a flexible exchange rate 
system.   
 
Elsewhere in this report (references) we have discussed the costs and benefits of “large” 
exchange rate adjustments.  We now turn to the question, if, for one reason or the other, 
the government does not wish to allow a full exchange rate adjustment, are there other 
mechanisms to which it can turn.  But before turning to that question, we need to ask one 
other: 
 
Are large trade deficits necessarily a problem? 
 
Large trade deficits have traditionally been viewed as a serious problem, a precursor to a 
crisis, something that should be dealt with quickly.  And there is ample experience 
suggesting that large trade deficits may b e a problem.  But there are circumstances in 
which it may not be, and an understanding of these circumstances is important for 
thinking through alternative ways of reducing trade deficits.   
 
Two examples illustrate the kinds of situations where trade deficits, even large trade 
deficits, may not represent a problem.  In 2000, Iceland ran a large trade deficit, close to 
9% of GDP.  The deficit was not caused by any government intervention in the market, 
but rather by consumers’ demand for cars, combined with the willingness of foreigners to 
finance the car purchases.  Presumably, when the stock of cars has been fully adjusted to 
the desired level, the surge of imports will end , and with that the deficit.  If foreigners 
lose confidence in the ability of those in Iceland to pay back the loans, they will stop 
lending, and those in Iceland were then reduce their importation of cars.  The credit is 
linked directly with the car purchases.   
 
The second is where a country borrows to finance an investment, and the investment 
yields a return far in excess of the interest which it has to pay.  This would typically be 
the case for private investment—why otherwise would firms borrow (unless there is some 
form of hidden government guarantee)?     
 
The standard criticism of large trade deficits is that they are not sustainable.  Countries 
cannot continue to borrow year after year to finance an excess of imports over exports.  
The situations described represent situations where even though the country may do so 
for an extended period of time, there are, in a sense, automatic adjustment mechanisms.  
When Iceland became saturated with automobiles, its demand for automobiles would 
decrease, and the capital inflows required to finance them would similarly disappear.  
Countries financing imports of productive capital goods will grow, and eventually will be 
transformed from borrowing countries to countries which are repaying the loans.  These 
are part of the natural evolution of the economy. 
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The systemic problem of deficits 
 
Deficits are, in a sense, endemic to current economic arrangements.  The sum of the 
surpluses in the world must equal the sum of the deficits, and if China and Japan insist on 
having surpluses, than, in aggregate, the rest of the world must have a deficit.  When 
Korea reduces its deficit, it must show up as an increase in the deficit of some other 
country.   
 
Alternative ways of addressing trade deficits 
 
Trade deficits are also equal to capital inflows, and capital inflows are equal to the 
difference between domestic investment and domestic saving.  At full employment, this 
means that the trade deficit can only be lowered by lowering investment or increasing 
domestic saving, and domestic saving can only be increased either by government 
increasing its surplus (reducing its deficit) or by the private sector increasing its savings.  
The most obvious way of addressing a trade deficit is for the government to reduce its 
fiscal deficit, but this is not the only way, and in many cases, alternatives make far more 
sense.   
 
In the case of Thailand, for instance, there was a huge need for public investment (roads, 
education).  The private sector was clearly overinvesting in real estate. The government 
could have dampened this overinvestment by a variety of mechanisms, e.g. tax policy (an 
increase in capital gains taxes, a tax on empty office buildings) or banking regulatory 
activity (restricting lending for real estate.)   
 
In the case of Iceland, the government could have imposed a tax on automobiles, which 
might have reduced the demand for automobiles, with some of what would have been 
spent on automobiles going into savings.   
 
Alternative ways of supporting the exchange rate 
 
The above macro-identity is sustained through an equilibrating adjustment of exchange 
rates.  If the government wants to limit the extent of the devaluation, there are means 
other than increasing interest rates which it may employ.  For instance, it can try to 
restrict imports (e.g. by imposing excise taxes on commodities which are imported or 
which have a large import content), or to encourage exports (through preferential access 
to credit.)  The government can redirect some of its own expenditures to less import 
intensive areas (technologies).  While critics might say that this introduces an 
inefficiency in the economy, the whole argument that the government should be 
concerned about the exchange rate is predicated on the believe that there is some market 
distortion, some reason that competitive market determination of exchange rates will not 
lead to efficient resource allocations.  If that is the case, then it makes sense for the 
government to think of a whole panoply of interventions by which the exchange rate can 




The argument that such interventions lead to economic inefficiency and should therefore 
be avoided has to be balanced against the arguments put forward earlier that large 
devaluations impose large costs, and that other instruments intended to limit devaluations 
themselves impose large distortions on the economy—including leading to massive 
underutilization of resources. 
 
B.  Alternative scenario:  Avoiding Default 
 
The scenario just described assumed that the government was willing to impose a 
standstill, in effect to default on its debt.  We began with that scenario, because it, in 
some sense, it presented the greatest risk.  Yet a close examination of the arguments 
suggested that the adverse consequences were greatly exaggerated, compared to the 
benefits.  In this section, we enquire what governments might do short of such a default.  
The easiest case is that where they have access to collateralizable asseets 
 
Borrowing against the future  
 
Such is the case for a country, like Bolivia, that has the potential for large revenues 
associated with natural resources.  Given the disparity between borrowing and lending 
rates, it makes sense for most such countries to create a stabilization fund, which the can 
draw upon in the event of an economic downturn.  But even when countries have not had 
the opportunity or foresight to do that, it makes sense for them to borrow against their 
future income.  As a back on the envelope calculation, assume that they spend $100 
million on an investment, and the multiplier is two.  The investment yields a 10% return 
on its own, but in addition, there is a 100% social return as a result of the utilization of 
underutilized resources.  This can be looked at another way.  Assume that the investment 
entails 10% foreign exchange.  The opportunity cost of the rest of the resources (the 
domestic resources) is zero.  Hence, with the real resource cost but a fraction of the 
market price, the rates of return are phenomenally high.   
 
There is a further advantage:  later, when the economy has recovered, it will be worried 
about currency appreciation resulting from the inflow of capital (the Dutch disease 
problem).  It will want to modulate the flow of capital into the capital.  It does this by 
spreading the inflows over time—by borrowing against future income.   
 
Thus, even if the implicit interest rates that it has to pay are quite high, it makes sense to 
borrow against the future to finance deficits that will restore the economy towards full 
employment. 
 
Low cost domestic borrowing 
 
There are ways, however, that governments can obtain low cost financing even when 
they do not have natural resources to sell forward.  One is through the domestic banking 
system.  If there is excess liquidity in the banking system, as there often is in a recession, 
increasing reserve requirements can increase the seignorage that the government obtains, 
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without have an undue adverse effect on the private sector.  Similarly, the government 
can require banks to hold a certain amount of government paper, and this requirement 
will lower the costs of government borrowing.  It could require them to hold a certain 
amount of zero coupon government paper.  Under standard accounting, this would reduce 
the government outflows, but under mark to market accounting for banks, the increase in 
the value of the bonds over time would show up as income.  The government could also 
borrow directly from the Central Bank at a low interest rate.   
 
The objection that such interventions lead to inefficiency in the allocation of capital is 
misguided.  It fails to distinguish between infra-marginal lending and marginal decisions, 
and it fails to note that capital, in any case, is not allocated by means of an auction market 
or its equivalent.   
 
Of more concern is the worry about inflation.  If the government borrows from the 
Central Bank, for instance, money is being created.  The increase in money, of course, 
need not be inflationary; after all, since the economy by assumption has large excess 
capacity, the increased aggregate demand could simply be reflect in increased output.   
 
The simple monetary equation MV = PQ provides a framework which is often used to 
assess inflationary pressures.  If the velocity is constant, the increase in money will be 
inflationary if the percentage increase in the money supply exceeds the percentage 
increase in output.  In the multiplier is 2, and output is 5% below capacity, then a deficit 
of 2 ½% of GDP  would suffice to restore full employment.  If M/PQ = .5, this means 
that ∆M = .025 GDP, or ∆M/M = .05, which is exactly equal to the increase in GDP, so 
there are no inflationary pressures.  If monetization in the economy is very small—less 
than .5,, then there will be inflationary pressures if V is constant.  But in such economies, 
money typically does not play the role it does in more advanced industrial economies, 
and there is little reason to believe that V will be constant.  Moreover, the government 
can control the spread between deposit rates and, say, T bill rates, so that the willingness 
to hold money increases (velocity is reduced), so that the monetary expansion is not 
inflationary.  It should be clear, however, that in low monetization economies, there are 
risks of the government not confronting the issue.  If they believe that inflation is gong to 
increase, their willingness to hold monetary assets will decrease, so that velocity 
increases, exacerbating the inflationary pressures.  If the movement out of money leads to 
increases in prices of producible goods, then aggregate demand will increase, and the 
extent of deficit that the government needs to restore the economy to full employment 
will be reduced.  But this need not be the case, e.g.  if the movement out of money leads 
to increases in prices of land.  But then the inflationary pressures may be felt more in 
such asset prices than in the price of produced goods, so that inflation (as conventionally 
defined, e.g. the consumer price index) is relatively little affected.20   
 
                                                 
20 The conventional analysis assumes that money is just used for income generating activities, not asset 
transactions, and assumes that money is non-interest bearing.  It also assumes that all transactions are 
mediated by means of money; ignores the role of credit.  None of these assumptions are correct, providing 
part of the explanation for the observed instability in V in many countries.  Government interventions can 
affect all of these variables.   
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Moreover, to the extent that the government can succeed in stimulating the economy 
without financing a deficit through monetary emissions (see below), GDP increases 
without an increase in money supply, and this will be deflationary.  Thus, the government 
can pursue a balanced course, financing a substantial deficit, without incurring large 
inflationary pressures.   
 
When measures are taken in discourage speculators by raising interest rates, the overall 
social costs of such measures can be ameliorated by taking advantage of the possibility of 
market segmentation.  Thus, the government could impose a tax on short term lending for 
speculative purposes, but exempt longer term lending and lending for purposes of trade.  
While there is likely to be some “leakage,” with some borrowing allegedly for trade 
purposes being used for speculative purposes, provisions which would impose high taxes 
on large increases in lending (unaccompanied by large increases in imports or exports) 
would surely dampen borrowing for speculative purposes almost as much as an increase 
in interest rates, without the adverse macro-economic effects.   
 
As the economy expands towards full employment, there will be an increase in the 
demand for imports, and some exports may be “crowded out,” leading to a deterioration 
of the exchange rate.  The magnitude of these effects can be  
 
 
Low cost stimulus 
 
The government can also restructure its programs to provide large stimulus to the 
economy at low budgetary cost.  Direct government lending programs may be 
particularly effective when firms face credit constraints.  Such programs can lead to large 
increases in expenditure and income with no budgetary cost.   Net investment tax credits 
provide high marginal incentives with low budgetary costs.  Linking longer carry-back 
provisions with investment (so that only firms that increase investment are entitled to 
longer carry-back provisions) simultaneously improves the efficiency of the tax system 
(since in principle there should be long lived carry back and carry forward provisions) 
and at the same time provides a strong stimulus at relatively low cost.  Unemployment 
insurance programs typically provide money to those who otherwise would have been 
forced to cut back consumption.   
 
Some countries may be able to avoid a crisis, and avoid having to use standstills and 
defaults, by borrowing against future income, by restructuring their borrowing, to rely 
more extensively on low budgetary costs of borrowing, and by restructuring expenditures 
and other programs to employ some low cost stimulus measures.  Given the seeming 
risks associated with standstills and defaults, we suspect that most countries that can 
employ such measures would be advised to do so, before turning to the actions described 





The arguments given so far look at the consequences from the perspective of an isolated 
country.  But the international community has to be sensitive to wider ramifications.  We 
describe these briefly below. 
 
Contagion and competitive devaluation   
 
One of the arguments against allowing devaluation is that it will lead to contagion.  The 
evidence on that is weak (e.g. neither Brazil nor Argentina led to contagion)—and the 
theory is even weaker.  There is no apriori reason to believe that an intervention in 
Indonesia that supports that country’s exchange rate should shift the demand curve for 
another country’s currency in a way which is stabilizing.  There are even reasons to 
believe that such interventions could have adverse effects, within a rational expectations 
model.21 
 
Contagion did occur in the context of Russia, and the mechanism, through balance sheet 
effects on particular firms that were active in other emerging markets, is very special, and 
is unlikely to occur more generally. 
 
There is a form of contagion that arose from the deflationary/recessionary policies, when 
pursued in more than one country, as these measures have adverse general equilibrium 
effects through the usual trade channels (including through effects on prices of traded 
commodities.) 
 
The argument concerning fears of competitive devaluations are also, for the most part, 
exaggerated.  The devaluations represent changes in exchange rates relative to hard 
currencies, such as the dollar.  If other neighboring countries devalue, it may reduce the 
competitive advantage that a country has vis a vis its neighbors, but it will still typically 
have the desired effect, because even when they all devalue, they will export more to the 
advanced industrial countries and import less. 
 
Moral hazard and induced speculation 
 
We have already drawn attention to the systemic effects associated with bail-outs:  the 
reduced incentives for due diligence in lending and reduced incentives by borrowers to 
obtain cover for foreign exchange fluctuations.   
 
Speculation, which has been at the center of some of the exchange rate fluctuations, with 
their adverse macro-economic impacts, also is fed by the interventions.  Such 
(destabilizing) speculation would be a zero sum (risky) game were it not for government 
intervention.  The bail-outs provide the funds that feed the speculative sharks. 
 
Increased default premia 
 
There is a concern that if many countries pursue the strategy described in A., interest 
rates to developing countries will increase, because of the fear of default.  But we have 
                                                 
21 Stiglitz reference 
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suggested that the social cost associated with these debts is high, and reduced borrowing 
that may result from higher interest rates may in fact be good economic policy over the 







In some cases, the economic plight of the country has been aggravated by contracts 
which are, or would appear to be, unfair.  For instance, corrupt governments have 
sometimes signed take-or-pay contracts at high prices, which in effect transfer large 
amounts of money abroad.  Sometimes such contracts may have been signed simply as a 
result of bad advice.  In any case,  crises represent occasions for renegotiations of such 
contracts.  Under the current regime, where governments have sometimes provided 
sovereign guarantees through the MIGA (the World Bank), government’s ability to 
renegotiate may be greatly impaired.  While governments undoubtedly need to take that 
into account as they proceed, the international community needs to think more carefully 




Several countries have had their downturn exacerbated, if not precipitated, by a lack of 
confidence in the banking system, leading to larger transfers of money abroad, reducing 
the availability of credit.  The broader issues of regulating banking systems will be 
addressed in another paper; here, we simply note that the government needs to be aware 
of the impact of policies on the stability of the banking system, and it must be ready to 






The analysis of this paper has identified a number of country specific factors which are 
relevant in determining the answer to the question of how the country should respond to 
its economic slowdown.  Even when there is detailed knowledge of the particular 
situation of the country, there remain a number of uncertainties, for instance, concerning 
the reaction of domestic and foreign investors, and the price setting behavior of firms.  
No policy is free from risk.  Key issues involve the magnitudes of the risks, and who 
bears them.  It would appear from the above analysis that for most countries, the risks 
associated with following the standard IMF austerity response is far greater than the risks 
associated with alternatives.      For countries that can gain access to foreign capital 
markets or restructure debt, to reduce the interest rate burden, the resources freed may 
provide the requisite finance for expansion fiscal policy.  For countries with large private 
foreign indebtedness, making more extensive use of bankruptcy, especially a super 
chapter 11, may be an important part of the response strategy.   For countries that can 
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administer effectively exit taxes and are willing to bear the criticisms of the financial 
markets, with the possible cut off of supply of credit, the imposition of such taxes (or 
other interventions that control the outflow of capital) would appear to be advisable.  
Even with an involuntary debt restructuring, countries can regain access to international 
banks relatively quickly, but countries should carefully weigh the costs and benefits of 
international indebtedness.  For many countries, especially those with moderate savings 
rates, the costs—when viewed over the longer term—may well outweigh the benefits, 
and policies designed to limit the inflow of especially short term capital may be desirable. 
 
Warding off problems 
 
We have noted several of the factors which have made adjustment to the decline in 
exports more difficult.  A heavy level of indebtedness is one factor, but heavy 
indebtedness in foreign currency makes matters even worse.   In the case of Russia, as the 
country faced increasing problems, it was encouraged by the IMF to borrow in foreign 
currency, because the interest rate was so much lower.  Of course, however, if the IMF 
had believed in well functioning capital markets, in which interest rate arbitrage occurs, it 
would have recognized that the difference between the two represented the actuarial 
value of the devaluation (plus an estimate of the difference in default probabilities 
between domestic and foreign denominated loans.)  An appropriate accounting 
framework would have “scored” the extra contingent liability associated with the dollar 
or mark denominated bonds, but as is so often the case with standard macro-accounting 
frameworks, they provide inadequate information for judging the country’s economic 
circumstances (though to the extent they come to be taken seriously by market 
participants, the incomplete information can have  real effects; those lenders might be 
fooled into thinking the country’s financial position was better with foreign-denominated 
borrowing than with domestic borrowing; in the case of Russia, this does not appear to be 
the case.  Only the IMF seems to have been fooled.  There is also (an admittedly) risky 
political economy argument:  that the higher level of foreign denominated indebtedness, 
by making a devaluation more costly, reduces the likelihood of a devaluation; and given 
that, it lowers the risk premium on domestic bonds.  But it also means that, should a 
devaluation be deemed necessary, the requisite size of the devaluation to restore balance 
will be larger—since the benefits on the export side are offset by the costs on the balance 
sheet side—or the magnitude of the default will have to be larger, and all of this increases 
the risk premium).   
 
Similarly tying the exchange rate to the dollar (as Argentina did) represents a triple 
hazard:  first, it eliminates one of the important adjustment variables, forcing larger 
adjustments in other variables.  Second, it means that when the US increases interest 
rates, the country will be adversely affected both directly—as those interest rate effects 
get passed on to all other markets; but also indirectly, as the dollar appreciates.  But as 
the dollar appreciates, it means the sustainability of the peg becomes more questionable, 
and so the risk premium associated with a potential devaluation increases.     
 




The analysis here was predicated on the IMF’s providing funds conditional on the 
countries imposing contractionary fiscal policies.  There is an alternative scenario, in 
which the IMF returned to its original mission of providing deficit financing for countries 
facing an economic downturn.  In that case, we might envision the following outcomes:  
Given the additional financing, the economy expands, closer to full employment.  Given 
that the country was assumed to have a zero structural deficit, as the economy returns to 
full employment, its need for borrowing decreases.  It borrowed a large amount—5% of  
GDP—so that its debt GDP ratio has increased to 45%.  Small adjustments in taxes and 
expenditures allow it, however, to finance these extra interest payments, and its ability for 
managing its way through the economic downturn has increased investor confidence, so 




Developing countries have, as a whole, had pro-cyclical fiscal policies, not because they 
have not understood the basics of Keynesian economics, but largely because they often 
have found it difficult to obtain finance, they have turned to the IMF, which has forced 
them to undertake pro-cyclical policies, and they have been afraid of taking some of the 
stronger measures discussed in this paper.  This paper has set forth a set of policies which 
are an alternative to the standard IMF prescriptions.  It has tried to delineate the 
circumstances under which such policies could be easily implemented, outlined the risks, 
and provide a framework for thinking through how these risks can be assessed relative to 
the risks of the standard IMF strategies.  At the very least, it should be clear that there 
exists alternatives, and that the impacts, including the risks, of the alternatives presented 
here on different groups is markedly different from that of the IMF strategy.  The IMF 
policies are not pareto dominant.  And given that that is the case, the choice of alternative 
strategies should be a matter which should be addressed by the country’s political 
processes, neither delegated to outsiders, such as the IMF, or relegated to particular 
insiders, such as the finance ministries or central banks.  The responsibility of outside 
advisers is to present as clear a depiction of the alternative strategies, the risks, who 
benefits and loses, and who bears the risks, as they can.  That has been the intention of 
this paper. 
 
 
